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Recent decades have seen the collapse and transformation of China's ancient 
polity. But in looking at the advent of nationalism, liberal democracies, 
Marxism, and other dynamic elements of a worldwide civilization, we 
should not forget the still largely unexplored resources of the Chinese 
people's own experience. The Chinese tradition is rich and various. 
Tomorrow other elements may emerge from it. 
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The United States presently finds itself standing at a remarkable historical 
juncture. As the world's only "remaining superpower," it enjoys the benefit of military 
superiority, economic prosperity, and vast cultural influence. Yet despite its seeming 
superiority to other nations -or, perhaps, in spite of it- the future is not necessarily 
secured for the United States. While Americans may be able to take American power for 
granted, there is a general sense that the United States is either at or near the apex of its 
influence; that, as Samuel Huntington has argued, while the U.S. will remain strong, its 
strength will decline relative to that of other civilizations. 
Besides this impending redistribution of relative power in the world, there is 
another problem that threatens U.S. prosperity and security; namely, a widespread 
dislike, distrust, and dissatisfaction with America in general - its culture, its success, and 
its foreign policy. While the extreme possibilities of this peril are encapsulated in the 
horror of 'terrorism,' it is not limited to terrorist activities per se. For every member of 
the Al-Queda network there are millions of Chinese and Arabs who, though less violent 
than terrorists, hold many of the same fundamental views toward America. Just as an 
Islamic fundamentalist believes the West, and particularly America, is an evil bent on 
eradicating Islamic culture and religion, many millions of Chinese are taught in their 
public education system that the U.S. is the primary protagonist against Chinese culture. 
They are taught that Americans delight in humiliating Chinese civilization. 
Anti-Americanism and anti-W estemism may become defining macrohistorical 
issues of the 21st Century; a corollary dynamic in the process of globalization. Since its 
founding, America has been able to respond to the waves of macro-historical challenge 
5 
with unparalleled security and resourcefulness. The Industrial Revolution found fertile 
ground in a resource-rich land relatively uninhibited by an entrenched economic form; 
American political independence and military achievement dictated that it was on the 
victor's end of the last gasp of imperialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; 
American geographic isolation strangely allowed it to prosper off of the cataclysmic wars 
that shook nearly every other civilization in the world during the 20th century. When the 
history books are written at the end of this century, anti-Americanism may very well 
appear a topic of macro-history alongside Communism/Capitalism, the world wars, 
imperialism, and industrialization. In order for the United States to respond successfully 
to this amorphous threat, it must take a very informed, proactive leadership role; for this 
challenge -unlike the ones which preceeded it- is aimed directly at the U.S. It is not an 
import or a threat that can be buffered by the cognitive dissonance of bordering oceans. 
It remains to be seen what type of leadership role America will take in responding 
to this challenge. For certain, we know that America is currently committed to the 
extermination of terrorist cells in countries around the world. But what of the pools of 
psychological discontent that breed terrorist cells in the first place? What of the millions 
of people who, though they will never become terrorists, sympathize with them? If these 
factors remain, is it possible that anti-Americanism will find surprisingly new forms of 
expression? One possibility is that Chinese nationalism could take on a unique face if 
their nation eventually confronts, as some have recently claimed, the "collapse of 
China." 1 Another possibility would be that, as the military and economic power of other 
nations rises in relation to the U.S., hate-filled nations could form dangerous alliances 
against America's best interests. 
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Even in the absence of catastrophe, there are many reasons why the United States 
would be wise to take a proactive stance in ameliorating the signals it sends to other 
peoples which feed anti-American biases. First, while many of the factors behind other's 
dislike of American culture are irrational and beyond our control, some are not; while 
there are indeed "evil" people out there whose socio-political designs incontrovertibly 
conflict with the founding principles of the United States, there is also a tremendous mass 
of the world population whose opinions can be swayed away from "evil." Indeed, while 
opportunists may use anti-Americanism as a noble toga draped over their will to power, it 
shouldn't obscure the fact that many of their adherents have grievances that are both 
rational and remediable. Second, the problem of anti-Americanism is not confined to 
foreign countries - it is an aspect of our own culture. Terrorists bent on destroying 
America, or at least some of its political structure or society, are nothing new to us: 
Timothy McVeigh lashed out against the federal government; the Columbine perpetrators 
felt victimized by a very inegalitarian school system; the young man who flew his student 
plane into a building in St. Petersburg was upset with America in general; whomever 
perpetrated the anthrax scare seems to be deeply antagonistic towards American media 
and politics. These are all examples of American citizens perceiving the same things in 
America that terrorist see: mainly, injustice, oppression, and routinized victimization. 
A third reason to reevaluate American behavior in response to global anti-
Americanism is that it is simply in our best interests. Strong institutions grow by learning 
what criticism to accept and learn from, and which to dismiss and move away from. At 
some point in history, the "American Experience" became grossly distorted in the minds 
of those in developing nations, as well as the minds of some who were raised within our 
1 Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China,, (New York: Random House, 2001). 
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own borders. An honest and thorough evaluation of how we as a nation have shaped that 
experience -whether or not it truly aligns with the best American democracy has to offer-
would strengthen our interests both at home and abroad. 
The improvement of relations with disenchanted peoples will not require that the 
United States drastically alter its fundamental priorities. Rather, what stands in need of 
correction is the way we go about our business abroad: the implied messages we 
communicate, the unexamined biases we express, the misunderstandings we 
unknowingly foster. 
• What are these implied messages? 
• How is it that while I see my country as a peaceful land of opportunity, 
millions see it as "ruthless, aggressive, conceited, arrogant, easily provoked, 
biased. "2? 
• What are the biases Americans communicate to other nations, and how? 
In this essay, I try to answer these questions in the context of the ongoing human 
rights dispute between China and the U.S. In the context of this disagreement, the 
question of how America communicates aggression, bias, and arrogance is answered in a 
preponderance of evidence that suggests that cultural miscommunications not only thwart 
American efforts to improve human rights, but, sadly, convey threatening motives to the 
Chinese populace. Despite our good intentions, America's effort to improve human 
rights practices in China has counterproductively alienated much of the Chinese 
population from U.S. interests. In other words, the American effort to improve human 
rights in China has estranged itself from the very humans whose rights it is trying to 
secure and protect. The key to an improvement of relations between the two countries is 
a more enlightened leadership approach; one contingent upon a better understanding of 
Chinese culture, as well as a more well-rounded appreciation of American history. 
CULTURE 
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Before beginning my analysis of the U.S.-Chinese human rights dispute, it is 
necessary to look more broadly at the role culture plays in the world in general, as well as 
in international relations. I will also define culture. 
We cannot understand culture without understanding the historical force which 
pre-empts our need to understand it (which has placed culture in the textbooks of nearly 
every course offered in university study - neuroscience, business, biology, not to mention 
the humanities). The historical force I am referring to, of course, is globalization. The 
term itself is ill defined. Politicians, scholars, and common people use it in many 
different ways. 
Political leaders around the world have different views of what globalization is. 
The official Chinese view is that globalization (quanqiuhua) is an economic force that, in 
its first phase, will allow it to finally gain equal-footing with the West in the modem 
world; and, eventually, allow Chinese civilization to re-assert itself as superior. 3 
American political leaders speak of globalization as a historical transformation that will 
eventually lead to the Americanization of global society, economy, and polity. The 
American line ofreasoning looks like this: globalization ⇒ open markets ⇒ societal 
awakening ⇒ creation of a middle-class ⇒ political reform ⇒ establishment of Western-
2 By Andrea Stone, "In Poll, Islamic World Says Arabs Not Involved in 9/11," USA Today, February 27, 
2002. 
style democracy. The Chinese line of reasoning looks more like this: open markets ⇒ 
belated economic independence ⇒ a natural ( and belated) re-enthronement of Asian 
superiority. 
In intellectual and political circles, globalization means different things to 
different people. Those who argue for "it" present an argument similar to the one 
presented by American politicians: the freeing of economic markets will benefit 
American financial interests as well as give it a more advantageous position to guide 
nations into choosing "the right future." 4 Intellectuals, however, often do not all align 
their opinions with this view. Noam Chomsky, for example, argues that globalization is 
simply a means by which American and British corporate-government interests continue 
to exist as the "first beneficiaries" of other people's natural resources. 5 
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To the common American, globalization seems to be a vague, though very real 
thing embodying distant contradictions. The term triggers a sense of democracy's 
impending triumph, as encapsulated in the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the image of the 
statue of liberty in the Tiananmen demonstrations. Yet it also suggests possible tumult, 
as sensed in the Seattle-WTO protests as well as the horror of terrorist attacks and Israeli-
Palestinian violence. Between these two bi-polar impressions of globalization there is a 
more sleek sense that globalization somehow means the homogenization of the world 
through devices of convenience and entertainment - the pc, the cell phone, the DVD 
player, and Hollywood entertainment. 
3 Thomas G. Moore, "China and Globalization," Asian Perspective, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1999, pp 65-95. 
4 This statement is a partial paraphrase of the sentiment expressed by President Clinton in the 2000 State of 
the Union Address: "We need to know we did everything we possibly could to maximize the chance that 
China will choose the right path." The statement was made after the bilateral agreement had been reached 
between Charlene Barshefsky, but before the congressional vote on granting China permanent normal trade 
relations. 
10 
Despite the lack of cogency between people's conflicting views of what 
globalization is, there are a few characteristics of it that one can pin down with relative 
certainty. First, in a metaphysical sense, global reality is a process that is shrinking the 
globe as it causes more and more interconnection between formerly dis-connected 
cultures. These two concepts -shrinkage and interconnectedness- are quite commonly 
used in conversations concerning the consequences and dynamics of globalization. 
Sometimes it is difficult to decipher what one means by these terms ( even if you are 
using them). Usually, it seems, both concepts find useful application in reference to both 
the generalized psychological sense imbued by globalization as well as its real dynamics. 
For instance, technology has -for all intents and purposes- shrunk the world: travel 
technology has erected bridges of hours between cultures where there was formerly a 
wall of weeks. The spread of capitalist markets and production has also created a very 
real sense of interconnectedness. The evidence for such interdependency lies in both 
macro- and micro-economic anecdote. Macro: the Asian Financial Crisis threatened the 
livlihoods of many more people than just Asians; micro: workers at the Boeing plant in 
Washington state rely on factories in 11 different countries to complete their airplanes. 
More vaguely, but no less importantly, the world simply seems more 
interconnected to the average person. Modem media carries images of other people's 
conflicts with more prominence and urgency than ever before. We frequently hear of 
pacts, alliances, and conferences being created or held between the representative powers 
of disparate cultures - WTO, UN, GATT, OAS, etc. Increasingly, production workers 
anywhere in the world are aware that they must work to increase productivity or their job 
5 Noam Chomsky, Whose World Order?, taken from 
http:/ /www.zmag.org/chomsky/whose _world_ order.htm. 
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will go to one of many hungry persons somewhere else in the world. In these generalized 
ways, interconnectedness seems to be occurring between peoples that were once 
separated by both geography and indifference. 
As the world shrinks and becomes more and more interconnected, there is a 
heightened need for new models of cross-cultural understanding. Existing mental cliches 
will not work; whether for co-workers in a multinational firm who have different cultural 
backgrounds, or for nations allying in trade organizations - cultural misunderstandings 
can spoil even the most promising relationships. 
Culture is also a pervasive factor in international politics. Samuel Huntington's 
The Clash of Civilizations and Francis Fukuyama' s The End of History and the Last Man 
- two landmark works of the past decade on international relations -- devote major 
portions of their work to the role of culture in the unfolding world order. 
Huntington treats cultural differences, which he more often states as civilizational 
boundaries, as inexorably divisive. Fukuyama takes a more moderate position on the role 
of culture in today's world. He admits that while there is often a disjunct between a 
people and their state because of culture, he argues extensively that culture will most 
likely prove less powerful than the forces of democracy and capitalism. Both authors see 
culture as an obstacle to peace and a potential source of violence, but they disagree over 
the relative force of this divisiveness in the face of other world forces; mainly, the 
momentum of democratic-liberal principles. Huntington argues that liberalism is 
ultimately weaker than civilizational differences; Fukuyama predicts that culture, while 
indeed an unpredictable wildcard in world geopolitical development, will ultimately 
prove weaker than the rational appeal of liberal democracy. 
12 
The point in introducing these views is not to bring about a reconciliation of the 
two. I believe that presently there is no reconciliation to be found between the two; that 
the actions of statesman and peoples will prove which abstraction best fits reality. 
During the 90s, events seemed to support Fukuyama's idea as countries from all 
civilizations enjoyed the benefits of a world economic boom, felt the negative effects of 
the Japanese economic crisis, and countries like Russia and China appeared to be on the 
path to democratization. However, the limits ofFukuyama's world of harmonious 
globalization were checked violently on September 11th . Suddenly, Americans were 
made to confront evidence that suggests globalization could mean more than layoffs at 
the local manufacturing plant - it could mean nothing less than death, hatred, and 
protracted military engagement. A world that once appeared to be best described by one 
theory now appears to be more accurately portrayed by another. 
These arguments and their related events are relevant to my research because they 
set the context in which I approach this issue of culture. They say resoundingly, "Culture 
matters. We're not sure exactly how, but we're sure that it does - that it is a real factor in 
international politics." 
The significance of culture in diplomacy is one of two reasons why I will refer to 
today's diplomacy as postmodern in this essay. Modem diplomacy (Cold War) was 
governed by nuclear weaponry and ideological black and white. The main question was 
'whose camp are you in, communist or capitalist?' With the collapse of the geopolitical 
world's ideological bifurcation and the dissemination of weapons technology, people's 
perceptions of the U.S. have become a national security issue. Moreover, there are now 
more cultures than ever that dominate the geopolitical landscape. Cultures once relegated 
to the periphery of the colonial or Cold War orders are now gaining due respect as their 
nations integrate into the world industrial-capital framework. 
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Another reason I refer to today's diplomacy as 'postmodern diplomacy' is its 
similarity to postmodern novels, which highlight information and advertising as sources 
of power and confusion. In this vein, America's presentation of itself has become a 
national security concern: some fight to make the image bold and resilient, some to soften 
it. Third, in keeping with the postmodern literary tradition, diplomacy now features an 
underlying metaphysical confusion; i.e. a world that has seen so many value-assigning 
'horizons' (religious, philosophical, ideological) come and go that people/nations find 
themselves in one of three camps. There is the camp that rejects the whole truth-finding 
activity as absurd, the camp that clings tenaciously and self-consciously to a traditional 
horizon, or the camp that believes in one horizon while tacitly admitting that that horizon 
is not binding on everyone. 6 
In the context of the postmodern world, unprecedented weight must be placed on 
cross-cultural awareness. Today, it is not enough to simply possess more nuclear 
weapons than Russia; what is important is how we communicate our missile defense 
initiative shield to their leaders. America's biggest threat is not the USSR, but the small 
groups of people or coalitions of people whose common bond is not an ideology but 
simple hatred. While no one is naYve enough to expect that this hatred will one day be 
eliminated, most recognize that America itself can do much to improve its image abroad. 
This image improvement will come about if American policymakers not only learn to 
better grasp other's cultures, but if they also find more constructive ways of harmonizing 
cultural differences. Each will require new ways of looking at the postmodern world. 
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A world of increasing interconnectedness is also a world of increasing moral and 
psychological complexity. In such a world, cultural differences should be, at least, a 
moot point so as to deamplify the other differences which will inevitably arise over 
conflicting interests and the unavoidable competition for limited resources. In order for 
this to occur, we must learn to apply new paradigms and perspectives to culture. It is 
vital that Americans in general, in an effort to become more representative global 
citizens, learn to better understand the dynamics and risks other nations face in adopting 
American values. 
Moral complexity requires two things of one wielding superior force. First, it 
requires restraint and critical thinking when labeling issues of conflict. In a postmodern 
world (or any world) moral absolutes are so deeply contested that they mustn't be 
cheapened by the thoughtless application of moral absoluteness to every disagreement 
that arises between people. The best bulwark against moral relativism is not moral 
zealousness but a wise and sparing discipline of knowing which issues are truly moral 
and which are best labeled as amoral preference. In my own experience as a Mormon 
missionary in Taiwan, I found that the most effective missionaries were the ones who 
suppressed their natural inclination to label every difference between them and their 
students as an issue of morality or religious correctness. The least effective missionaries 
were those who sought to convert the Taiwanese to many things beyond the fundamental 
principles of Mormonism. Oftentimes these would be things as frivolous as American 
cultural or aesthetic preferences. 
Second, moral complexity requires wisdom in regards to interpreting the actions 
and motives of other people. Even if America's national interests were perfectly aligned 
6 Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity, (Harvard: 1989). 
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with standards of moral correctness, all its actions would not necessarily be morally 
upright. Max Weber best expressed this truth when he said, "It is not true that good can 
only follow from good and evil only from evil, but that often the opposite is true."7 Thus, 
while American goals and motives may be pure, the actions they effect may actually 
come across as perniciously (and oftentimes conspiratorially) destructive by those on the 
receiving end of that behavior, who sit on the other side of a dizzyingly complex 
cognitive kaleidoscope of history, culture, and psychology. How else could Chinese 
citizens come to resent American efforts to improve their political condition? How else 
could U.S. goodwill be interpreted by hundreds of millions of Chinese as an effort to 
undermine the legitimacy of a government which, though they admit is not perfect, has at 
least gotten them into the 21st century? 
For an American, it is extremely difficult to accept that our nation's good 
intentions are misconstrued by peoples abroad, let alone people for whom we seem to be 
sticking our collective neck out for, so-to-speak; peoples for whom we are simply 
attempting to improve living conditions and extend rights and liberties. One might be 
tempted to label such recipients as ungrateful and blame their ingratitude on the 
communist party, assuming-in keeping with Western liberal orthodoxy- that all peoples, 
if given a choice, would choose to enjoy the rights which we enjoy. And that it must be 
that the communist party has so successfully suppressed the flow of information in China 
that it has misconstrued the meaning of otherwise altruistic U.S. intentions. Both 
assumptions carry with them a portion of the truth, but to rest on these assumptions is to 
miss a glaring point - most Chinese do not want increased political freedom if it either (a) 
comes at the expense of economic stability or (b) if it is imposed upon -or even 
7 7 Taken from Kishore Mahbubani 's Can Asians Think where it is used in a similar context. 
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accompanied by- by outside force or even influence. Thus, the Chinese presently value 
both subsistence and autonomy as their inalienable human rights. It doesn't take a 
culturally relativistic standpoint to accept this notion, but a simple acknowledgement that 
both came much earlier in the American experience than did the rights proclaimed in the 
Declaration of Independence ( of which still the majority of Americans had to wait 
decades to enjoy). 
There are several reasons for this shocking phenomenon of inverse interpretation: 
that is, the experience Americans are now coming to terms with (especially since 
September 11th) of projecting good motives upon another people only to be repaid with 
suspicion, guilt, and/or "evil." The first and most obvious reason is that people tend to 
share an inviolable kinship bond which is easily offended when some party outside that 
bond attempt to regulate or judge someone within it. For example, while I may criticize 
the prevalence of "a McDonald's on every street comer" in America, I tend to bristle 
when a foreigner criticizes my homeland for the same. The second reason why good 
intentions can be repaid with evil in the arena of international politics is simple history. 
After centuries of being on the brunt end of unfair treaties, imperial arrangements, and 
territorial abrogations, nations such as China are rightly suspicious of Western motive. A 
third reason, and one that is interrelated to the previous two, is culture. Within Chinese 
culture it is a large taboo to a) criticize without proper relationship (guanxi) and b) 
emphasize differences over similarities. Presently, the U.S. human rights approach 
commits both cardinal errors. There are few quicker routes to damaging trust in Chinese 
culture, yet each are an obvious aspects of the current U.S. policy on human rights in 
China. 
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From the outset, I want to establish the limits of cultural understanding as a tool in 
international affairs. The suggestion of making attempts to better understand another's 
culture may trigger an unconscious bias that this author is somehow apologetic in the face 
of the flack America catches by virtue of its being the dominant superpower. This 
presumption is unfounded. I recognize that there are limits to cultural awareness in 
smoothing over relations between nations of markedly different cultures. For example, I 
don't argue that improved cultural awareness will ever eliminate the need for tangible 
negotiating tools, such as: economic sanctions and rewards, military action, and exclusion 
from and inclusion in alliances. Furthermore, postmodern diplomacy -and, more 
specifically, post-September 11th diplomacy- will consist of many integral aspects. One 
example is the possible implementation of a "new Marshall Plan" as advocated by 
Richard Sokolksky in a recent New York Times op-ed. Another essential aspect of 
postmodern relations is our communicating to world leaders that we do not approve of 
the scapegoating of America for their nation's problems (Nicholas Kristoff recently made 
this argument in the context of the Chinese educational system). While examples such as 
these two are still waiting to be implemented, the effort to improve America's image 
abroad has already begun. The Bush administration recently hired a public relations 
specialist (Charlotte Beers) to improve America's image. 
DEFINITION 
I define culture as a set of normative presumptions shared by a society, state, or 
civilization. Since my analysis is directed at cultural communications in the content and 
context of policy formulations, I find it appropriate to designate this philosophic 
definition. I also feel this appropriate because I will be analyzing the metaphysical and 
moral frameworks behind the policy arguments of the CCP and the State Department. 
Analyzing these frameworks reveals the underlying normative presumptions at work in 
the human rights dispute. For the purposes of this essay, I have identified two primary 
axes of normative assumptions which clearly contrast between America and China: face 
and modes of promise-making. 
On a broad level, people carry normative presumptions about the how nations 
should conduct themselves as well as how power should be distributed between nations. 
On a more microscopic level our cultures have differing premises concerning justice, 
fairness, and interpersonal interactions. Both are important to harmonious diplomacy, 
especially in this period of postmodern diplomacy when people's opinions of us are 
tantamount to a major national security issue. 
How does culture matter? So what? And, what are we to do about it; i.e. what 
operational frameworks need be adopted to deal with this vague concept of people's 
collected beliefs, biases, and values? More specifically, how do we continue to pursue 
our concrete aims without getting bogged down in the abstract mess of evaluating 
another's perceptions of how we conduct ourselves? 
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This definition of culture as a set of normative presumptions makes practical 
usage of the host of information one can gather about another culture. When one usually 
thinks about culture, one thinks of the defining differences between one's own culture 
and a foreign culture. For an American envisioning the culture of the Chinese, images of 
chopsticks or the sounds of a queer, choppy language may come to mind. Common 
categories of emphasis include eating, philosophy, religion, and ideas of what constitutes 
"polite" behavior (the act of bowing in Japan). In my own cross-cultural interactions, I 
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have found it very practical to see these all as differences of normative appeal towards a 
wide-range of human behaviors. From this point of view, one can set one's own opinion 
about which differences are simple biases or aesthetic preferences, and which are 
fundamental disagreements over principle and truth. 
Herein lies the crux of effective communications between people of different 
cultures in day-to-day circumstance as well as between nations in policy formulations: 
recognizing which points of view are of necessity moral, which are moral and workable, 
which are moral and unworkable, and which are irrelevant preferences. It is not my 
purpose to apply these categories towards every American foreign interests. However, by 
the end of this essay, it will be apparent that I designate the human rights issue to be a 
moral issue that is presently unworkable. The recalcitrant nature of the issue I blame 
both on the unique historical positioning of the Chinese as well as on the self-limiting, ill-
informed approach Americans have chosen to adopt towards human rights practices 
there. 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS DISPUTE 
On a yearly basis, the U.S. State Department issues a report to the world on 
human rights conditions in the People's Republic of China. Within a week, the Chinese 
issue an impassioned, defensive response. The State Department's report makes 
judgements on immoral aspects of CCP rule; year after year, the Chinese respond with 
heated accusations of hypocrisy and charges of "interfering in the internal affairs of other 
countries." 8 At the very least, disputes like this are interpreted by the Chinese people as 
8 U.S. Human Rights Record in 1999, Information Office of the State Council of the P.R. of China, 
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/7248. 
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proof that the U.S. presumes itself the world's moral policeman; at the very worst, U.S. 
behavior is distorted by CCP propaganda to demonize the U.S. government as an 
international bully dead-set against relinquishing its imperialistic tendencies. Both 
results represent the lose/lose situation the current American effort has boxed itself into. 
The United States should shelve its efforts to improve human rights conditions in 
China through these means for two reasons. First, the current approach is 
counterproductive. The Chinese government has grown more and more bold in refuting 
U.S. charges. Ten years ago, the CCP simply did not respond to accusations of human 
right abuses, tacitly ignoring a source of embarrassment. Today, emboldened by a 
popular anti-U.S. rallying point, the CCP proudly defends itself while levying its own 
accusations against the U.S. The American effort have erred so badly that China has 
moved from a nation that publicly ignores its sins to a nation that boldly defends them. 
More important than the CCP rhetorical response, however, is their response in 
practice: respect of human rights has not increased at any point since the U.S. stepped up 
its pressure in the early 90's. In some years, as State Department reports indicate, abuses 
have only increased. 
Lack of cooperation on the part of the CCP is only one part of the evidence that 
suggests U.S. efforts to improve human rights conditions have been counterproductive. 
The other part lies in the increasing resentment, mistrust, and hostility the Chinese 
populace harbors towards the U.S. Americans err in assuming that the Chinese voices 
clamoring for democracy and human rights are indicative of the majority of Chinese 
opinion. In fact, these voices are a diminutive minority that receives a grossly 
disproportionate amount of media attention. The fact is that most of China's one billion 
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plus people are presently not interested in the rights America wants it to universally 
adopt. This indifference is not a sign of barbarism nor is it a result of brainwashing - it is 
the natural culmination of the history and culture of a people who have always favored 
the pragmatic over the theoretic, but have been given more reason to do so after a century 
of ideological upheaval that, let's face it, Americans simply cannot empathize with. 
Presently, the Chinese are content with the human rights they've secured - independence 
from foreign domination, economic subsistence, and security. 
If American's desire to heighten cross-cultural understanding is sincere, it behooves 
them to examine their own history. Americans too savored the taste of political 
independence and economic security before they haggled over the Bill of Rights. And 
even after those political rights were secured, they were extended in a very inegalitarian 
distribution. More than two centuries later, it is natural -but cognitively costly- for 
Americans to take independence and subsistence for granted. Did not the anger against 
foreign-intervention-mixed-with-condescension shown in the Boston Tea Party precede 
the constitutional convention? China is only now emerging from the colonial 
consequences of humiliation and psychological subjugation. Americans once emerged 
from similar, though less drastic, circumstance in the late 1700s. Even someone who 
refutes culturally relativistic arguments should concede that autonomy is a more basic 
right than something like freedom of expression. 
As contact through trade, education, and media increases between our 
psychologically disparate nations, it is necessary to look to new cognitive models in 
making sense of the Chinese experience. Presently, many Americans are caught up in a 
knee-jerk bias that interprets the Chinese political situation in bipolar moral rhetoric. It 
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sees the Chinese people as a billion oppressed dissidents (and possible consumers of U.S. 
goods) who are waiting for someone stronger to help them out. This conception ofreality 
couldn't be further off the mark. Another popular bias is the post-World War II fear that 
any aberration in human rights respect must be rooted out or it will lead to nazi-type 
atrocities. This is a faulty historical analogy when applied to the Chinese situation. A 
more apt analogy would be one from our own history, which is no stranger to the 
exclusion of large elements of its population from the umbrella of rights, liberties, and 
dignities. 
The second reason in favor of ending our current policy towards China's human 
rights practices is both hypothetical and historical: if China faces an economic collapse, 
as many financial analysts predict, it may look to other nations for both political and 
economic guidance to save itself. China, as well as many other nations who have 
modernized in the past two hundred years, has looked to foreign leadership in the past. 
The Self-Strengthening movement of the late 19th century borrowed from Western ideas 
and technology. The communist revolution borrowed from the Russian experience. 
More recently, Deng Xiaoping's "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is a strange 
hybrid of native and foreign principles of progress. Should China hit tough times in the 
future, it may appeal to the outside. Due to U.S. economic capital, this appeal will 
undoubtedly be extended to it; however, if American moral policy continues its present 
course, it will have bankrupted its moral capital by the time when it really would be 
worth something. 
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THE CULTURAL DIMENSION 
As mentioned above, harmony and productivity in the globalizing world is contingent 
upon the mental agility of all involved. The acceptance of new mental modes of 
thinking, as well as fresh models and metaphors, is vital to this adaptation. I have 
mentioned the need for new historical analogies. However, the purpose of this essay is to 
focus on another area of cognition - culture. 
Hidden within the human rights debates and other geopolitical disputes between 
China and the U.S. are indicators of a large disparity in respect and understanding of 
Chinese culture. In the case of U.S. reports on human rights abuses, there are two main 
cultural axioms that are either overlooked or misapplied by U.S. policymakers: first, no 
heed is given to the overriding Chinese desire to preserve 'face' (surface reputation). 
This omission by the American government plays into the hands of those who would like 
the Chinese people to believe that America is a bullying Goliath bent on discrediting 
other great civilizations. Second, many of our accusations against the CCP human rights 
policies are ignorant of the Chinese cultural difference between ke tao hua and ying chou 
hua: empty speak and full speak. Ke tao hua is an accepted form of speech in Chinese 
society in which promises are made from one party to another, yet both parties may not 
fully expect the promises to be kept, pending circumstance. Ying Chou Hua, on the other 
hand, is a form of promise making in which the participants both expect fulfillment. CCP 
leadership often tacitly engages in a form of empty speak with its people. America's 
purposes are thwarted when its government attempts to intervene in this discussion 
without understanding the language rules that regulate it within the native culture. People 
generally tend to resent outsider interference in insider conversation; the more so when 
the outsider is as threatening and foreign a power as the United States is. 
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Beyond these two cultural axioms, there is a fundamental disagreement between the 
two societies about which human rights are most important. While Americans inherently 
maintain the inborn rights to abstract freedoms of expression, protest, and humane 
treatment, the Chinese point out the necessity of security, economic livelihood, and 
subsistence. 
FACE 
"Face" is perhaps the most pervasive cultural factor in Chinese thought, behavior, 
politics, and communications. The establishment of face is a vital aim in Chinese 
introductory interactions; the maintenance and strengthening of face is a necessary aspect 
of harmonious interactions; the loss of face is a cardinal mistake tantamount to 
discrediting oneself. As with the Chinese people, so to with the Chinese nation. Foreign 
nations are held to the same cultural standards that the Chinese hold all people, native or 
foreign. This idea is not that far off from something that exists in American culture, or 
indeed in all cultures - the attachment of value, respect, and deference to another party in 
varying degrees. Just as Americans may hold one person in high repute and another in ill 
repute, so too we may hold one nation in esteem (Britain) and another in low regard 
(Iran). 
Yet understanding the cultural significance of face in Chinese society is not as 
simple as finding an analogy from one's own culture and assuming the meaning to be 
transferable. Such an assumption would be grossly in err for three reasons: first, face 
plays a centrality in the Chinese mind that cannot be gauged by any Anglo-centric 
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compansons. Second, the criteria for projecting face upon someone in Chinese culture 
does not completely align with the criteria Westerners use in granting another party 
respect. While there are many characteristics of a person or society that merit respect and 
face in both cultures ( education, achievement, and family life), there are a host of 
judgement criteria which are unique to Chinese society. These criteria, though difficult 
to understand, are vital to the development of genuinely harmonious relations with 
Chinese people in general, not to mention Chinese representative organs. Harmonious 
relations based upon trust and respect are vital if America is serious about changing 
human rights practices in China; otherwise, American efforts amount to nothing more 
than empty posturing and condescending rhetoric. The judgement criteria include 
standards of humble deference, respect to guanxi, an attitude that emphasizes agreement 
over disagreement, and a temperament that places convergence before divisiveness. 
One example of how U.S. diplomats already grasp these concepts, and thus 
conduct themselves in face-saving ways, occurred at the recent Asian Economic Summit. 
The summit was President Bush's first meeting with Chinese officials. At a dinner 
introducing President Bush to the CCP leadership, the American diplomatic team was 
asked to have Robert Rubin introduce President Bush. It was not enough for Bush to 
simply hold the title of President of the United States: he needed to go through the 
formality of building on someone else's guanxi. In this case, the guanxi belonged to 
Rubin, the former Clinton treasury secretary and a trusted advisor to Chinese leadership. 
The Bush team wisely assented to this arrangement. By doing so, it went a long way 
towards setting the terms for a productive relationship between Bush and the CCP. 
President Bush established face in this incident by a) building upon the face of one whom 
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the Chinese already respect (instead of assuming his position as president guaranteed it to 
him), and b) respecting a deep-seated cultural norm to approach power through pre-
existing channels of communication. The move also had symbolic weight - it suggests 
President Bush is willing to build on common ground instead of focusing on differences. 
The third difference between Chinese and Western culture is in the way each 
conceives face. It may be said that both American and Chinese cultures attach value to 
the concept of face. However, much more weight is attached in Chinese culture than in 
American. Evidence of the concept of face in American culture is evident in Dale 
Carnegie's best-selling book How To Win Friends and Influence People. Carnegie 
relates a face-saving incident at a party where one of the guests claimed a quotation to be 
taken from the Bible. Another guest, who was listening nearby, remarked to his friend 
that he, in fact, had conclusive evidence that the statement came from the mouth of 
Shakespeare. His friend urged him to correct the speaker, but he refrained, choosing 
instead to value the speaker's public reputation over factual correctness. Mr. Carnegie, 
for the sake of winning friends and influencing people, advocates this face-saving 
attitude.9 
This example only approximates the concept of face in Chinese culture. It serves 
as a platform from which one must step in order to understand the centrality and nuanced 
implications behind what it means to "save face" in Chinese culture. The first step an 
American must take away from his Anglo-centric concept of face ( as illustrated in Mr. 
Carnegie's example) is to accept that in the Chinese mind, the dinner guest would not 
even consider correcting the speaker because the appearance of harmonious relations -
even if they appear false to the American mind- are of indisputable, seminal importance. 
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The Chinese mind unconsciously guides behavior towards harmonious social 
relationships; the American mind is more likely to guide behavior towards abstract 
models of truthfulness, honesty, and factual correctness. A rough analogy that gauges the 
offense incurred in the Chinese mind by face-losing behavior is understood if one 
imagines an American who continually corrects the minor imperfections in an 
interlocutor's grammar, logic, or accuracy. Instead of viewing this upstart as "anal" or 
"uptight," a Chinese person would likely view them as patently "rude" and 
presumptuously "arrogant" similar to how an American would view someone who tread 
upon our own cultural values. The nearest example of this type of affront in American 
culture would be someone at a funeral who decides to speak accurately about the faults 
and mis-steps of the deceased person; in most cases, this would rub against the grain of 
the other family members present, who value deference and respect to the deceased 
regardless of his mistakes. 
Attempts such as this to transmit cultural understandings are unavoidably fuzzy. 
Such is the confusing nature of learning to understand another's culture. The most 
accommodating tools in such a process are an open mind -one willing enough to slow the 
knee-jerk nature of one's normative judgements - and a keen mind -one that attempts to 
step into the minds of Chinese conversationalist and imagine sympathetic analogies such 
as the ones presented above. One must always remember that these analogies are only 
approximate; that is, they do not get at the exact experience of the Chinese -
nevertheless, they are extremely valuable. The value of such approximations is greatly 
increased when one adopts the mindset that they are working theses in a lifelong attempt 
to understand a formidable subject. 
9 Richard W. Hartzell, Harmony In Conflict, (Taipei: Caves Books Ltd.), 1988, pg. 309. 
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A useful analogy was drawn for me after a face-losing situation in Taiwan. I was 
sitting in the home of a Chinese family of six, as a dinner guest along with my American 
friend. At one point in the introductions, I was told I had very good Chinese-speaking 
skills. "Thanks," I replied. At that the conversation hushed into an uncomfortable, feet-
shuffling confusion. Seconds later it was resuscitated by one of the family members and 
steered to a new topic. After dinner, my friend reminded me that one of the quickest 
ways to lose face in Chinese culture is by directly accepting a compliment (this gets at 
another Chinese cultural axiom - humble deference). My friend's comment came as an 
affront to my pride. I thought of myself as a well-acculturated missionary, having been in 
Taiwan for well over a year and developed a number of meaningful relationships with 
natives. I argued with my friend for a while until he insisted that I take a rational look at 
the reaction my comment caused. I couldn't refute the chill my comment had effected 
(although some do, arguing that the Chinese should learn to see things from the 
foreigner's perspectives). He then suggested an analogy of his own by suggesting that I 
imagine having had, as a teenager, invited a high-school friend over to eat dinner with my 
family. Over the course of the dinner my friend chose to use vulgar language in 
responding to questions raised by my mother. The response -an embarrassed chill, if not 
downright angry offense- would have been similar. In both situations, the host's opinions 
of the guest would have taken a hit; guests in both scenarios would likely be viewed as 
ungrateful, disrespectful, and even insolent. 
While there are many cultural axioms that influence ways face is preserved, the 
most prominent two are emphases on the appearance of social harmony and the 
preservation of personal reputation. Failure by a foreigner or foreign nation to respect 
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these innate values results in nothing less than a personal insult to the dignity and 
humanity of those concerned. Taking a cultural evaluation of one's behavior into 
consideration is necessary to understanding the confusing truth expressed by Max Weber 
and illustrated in global, anti-American sentiment today. Evil can follow from good if 
one's perception of his own good trespasses upon the sacrosanct values of another 
culture. 
One could argue that this is irrational, but that point is moot. It is evident after 
nearly four centuries of contact between the West and China that certain cultural values 
are an inexorable fact not to be exterminated by any amount of Westernization, 
modernization, or even inner-imposed "Cultural Revolution." They must be dealt with 
tactfully. The alternative is a serious breeches in trust, which ultimately leads to 
ineffective communications, misunderstanding, conflict, and extreme bitterness. Factors 
such as these can no longer be dismissed by even the most powerful nation in the world. 
The concept of face-preservation relates to U.S.-Sino relations more in our 
methods of communication than in fundamental policy formulations. In the case of the 
human rights debate, a re-evaluation of the deference we give to face would not 
necessarily mean that the American embassy in China refrain from keeping track of 
human rights abuses in China or that Americans come to accept those abuses (heaven 
forbid!), but it would alter the ways in which the U.S. pursues its policy aims. Presently, 
the U.S. seeks to advance the cause of human rights in China through a variety of 
methods. While I examine each of these in a separate section, it is necessary to state my 
main argument as concerns each of them: that they ultimately thwart their ultimate 
purpose - broadening the appeal of human rights practices. State Department reports, 
30 
comments by visiting statesmen, and American press denunciations of China's bid to host 
the 2008 Summer Olympics, to name just a few - these and other methods alienate the 
U.S. from the people whose rights it assumes itself to be defending. 
American attempts to improve human rights practices in China fail for reasons 
cultural as well as psychological. In other words, condescending rhetoric, scathing 
reports, intellectual condemnation - each of these would earn defensive, uncooperative 
reactions from people of any cultural background. It just happens that in this situation the 
behavior simultaneously offends the deepest cultural predispositions of the Chinese 
people to respect face through emphasizing similarities and preserving the appearance of 
surface agreement even if parties disagree in private. Pressure in human rights reform 
also deeply offends the Chinese sense of autonomy and self-sufficiency. 
American ignorance and insensitivity is the CCP's gain: as the collective Chinese 
opinion of the U.S. has gone down, popular support of the communist party has risen. 
Based upon survey results collected by a group of American-trained academics, the CCP 
enjoyed more popular support in the mid-90s than it did in the mid-80s. 10 As the Chinese 
government has lessened its control on economics, lifestyle, travel, and education, its 
popularity has -not surprisingly- increased. But expansion of freedom is not the only 
factor enabling an increase in popularity of an oft-pronounce 'moribund' regime. The 
Chinese people seem to give their government more credit with each attempt the U.S. 
makes to discredit it. The Chinese emphatically resent any foreign government 
10 
lO Taken from Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations, page 31. Ming cites a study done by Jie 
Chen, Yang Zhong, and Jan William Howard in Beijing, 199 5. The poll was designed to gauge popular 
support of the communist regime. Result were compared with a similar poll done in the mid-80s which 
showed that support for the CCP was then "moderate" (31 ). A comparison showed that, contrary to 
common perception, support for the CCP had actually increased. 
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criticizing its own, regardless of the truth-value or moral high ground evident in the 
criticisms. 
The Europeans provide a viable alternative to the moral high-mindedness of 
American human rights policies. The European Community, more intimately aware of 
the horrors of human rights atrocities than the U.S., chooses to pursue improvement of 
practice in China by deferring to regional human rights institutions and promoting 
multilateral monitoring. European countries did not link human rights concerns with 
foreign policy until the late 1970s, but still remain much less coercive than the U.S. 
Reasons for less overt pressure on behalf of the Europeans include "respect for [China's] 
ancient civilization ... sensitivities about its century of humiliation, and lack of domestic 
lobbies." 11 
For Americans to accept that their human rights policies are defective does not 
mean a rejection of the human rights cause in general. It simply means that good 
intentions should be funneled into different, more effective channels. For instance, while 
collective U.S. policy has proven counterproductive, the individual acts of certain 
Americans have proven disproportionately effective. The New York Times Magazine 
recently published an article on John Kamm, the former president of Hong Kong's 
American Chamber of Commerce. Kamm, it seems, has turned retirement into a time for 
personally secure the release of Chinese political prisoners. Surprisingly, he has 
succeeded in securing the release of over 200 grateful democracy advocates, activists, 
and other so-called (by the CCP) "subversives." 12 Efforts such as these should be 
11 Min Wang, Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations, (University of Pennsylvania Press: 2001 ), pg. 
67. 
12 
The story on Kamm was taken from The New York Times Magazine, March 3rd 2002, Section 6, written 
by Tina Rosenberg. I put "subversives" in italics not because Rosenberg wrote it, but because subversive 
encouraged, for they are not only effective, but they do not threaten to destabilize 
relations between the two nations. 
EMPTY SPEAK AND FULL SPEAK 
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One of the most frustrating tenets for a Westerner to grasp in communicating with 
the Chinese lies in the area commitment making. In the West, a person's character is 
judged in part by the commitments they keep or don't keep as well as the truth-value of 
the intentions they express in making promises. This is not always the case in China 
where people regularly engage in two forms oftalk-ke tao hua, or 'empty speak,' and 
ying zhou hua, or 'full speak.' 
Full speak is a form of speaking Westerners are most likely to expect in setting 
commitments and establishing expectations between two parties. In general, if someone 
tells us they will be over to dinner at a certain time, we expect them to be there. In the 
West, we assume that, 99% of the time, if someone is speaking of a commitment or 
setting an expectation between two or more parties, that his words are "full" of his true 
intentions; that he is being "honest" in expressing his true intentions to follow through on 
what he promises. In China, this is the case much less than 99% of the time. The reason 
for this is that the two cultures have differing concepts of honesty. 
In Chinese culture, honesty is not as contingent upon truth-value as with Western 
culture. The Chinese often engage in 'empty speak' when it concerns appointments, 
engagements, and other practical matters. If, for instance, a Chinese person tells 
someone they will meet them for dinner at a certain time and fail to show up, the 
behavior is one of the many offenses the CCP regularly accuses its enemies of. Another such epithet is 
"counter-revolutionary." 
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disappointed party does not feel compelled to ask for anything more than a cursory 
explanation. Typically, the Chinese will offer a very flimsy excuse for standing someone 
up: "my mom is sick," "I had an emergency meeting," etc. In the Chinese psyche, the 
probability that these statements are factually untrue does not change their degree of 
honesty. A statement is "honest" so long as it is not meant to "cheat, defraud, or 
physically harm someone." 13 So long as malice or deception is not involved, the Chinese 
may speak words that are empty of true intent. 14 
These truths should not be missed in examining the relationship between the CCP 
and Chinese society. The CCP often makes verbal commitments to such things as the 
development of grass-roots level democracy (village elections), freedom of speech, and 
greater political tolerance in general only to renege or peripheralize these promises. To 
the silent majority of the Chinese population, this empty speak is not nearly as vitriolic as 
CCP attempts to cheat and defraud the public. The West often forgets that one of the 
primary causes ofTiananmen unrest - if not the primary complaint - was increasing 
evidence of intraparty corruption. 
Returning to the intricacies of Chinese culture, in many cases, infactual 
statements may be seen as more 'honest' than factual statements because they are meant 
to convey a sense ofrespect to the party involved. For example, the Chinese rarely tell 
Christian missionaries in Taiwan that they are not interested in hearing their message. 
Instead, they will agree to an appointed meeting time, and simply not show up. Once a 
missionary becomes acculturated to Chinese cultural practicality, he or she realizes that 
the invited person simply did not want to show disrespect or loss of face by directly 
13 Richard Hartzell, Harmony in Conflict, (Taipei: 1988), pg. 325. 
14 Taken from my own experiences in Taiwan and China, and corroborated by Hartzell. 
refusing to meet with the missionaries; that would be a greater insult than accepting the 
invitation, but not showing up in the end. 15 
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Western culture is not totally void of accepted forms of empty speak. In dating in 
particular, empty statements are accepted as much more tactful than full ones. A woman 
who tells a pursuing man that she is busy on a night when he would like to take her out is 
not labeled a dishonest person, but a kind, good-hearted one. There are other spots on 
the Western communication landscape where empty speak is acceptable. In business 
settings it is quite common for associates with "connections" to make empty promises of 
job "hook-ups" or other benefits without full intent of provision. Given the prevalence of 
preserving face and upholding the appearance of harmony in social interactions, instances 
such as these are more common in Chinese communication. 
Forms of speaking, empty or full, are taken for granted in Chinese culture. A 
Chinese person engages in making commitments without, necessarily, being aware of 
which form of speech he is engaging in. The Chinese are, above all else, practical 
people. One may make a commitment on Tuesday which one intends to fulfill on 
Saturday, but practical circumstance intervenes between to make the Saturday 
appointment much less practical. In the final analysis, the person would be mystified if 
he were questioned as to why he didn't fulfill his Saturday obligation, for, in the Chinese 
mind, there is virtue in expressing one's hopes in the form of expectations. Furthermore, 
it is an unquestioned given that expectations be stated with a silent "circumstance 
pending" tacked on the end. 
15 The experience of being "fang'ed" (Americanization of the Chinese idiom for being stood up - fang wo 
gezi) for missionaries is a daily occurrence. In two years, I saw it dealt with in a variety of ways: some 
ignored it and didn't attempt another appointment set-up; some ignored it but pursued more appointments; 
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Empty speak and full speak are facts of Chinese culture that should be taken into 
consideration when casting an eye on interactions between the Chinese state and society. 
Americans in particular transmit Cold War-era biases into their view of the Chinese state-
society scenario. We naturally assume that the only way a communist regime can 
maintain control of society is through coercion and force. While coercion and force are 
undoubtedly part of the CCP's present practices (not to mention deception), there are 
more prominent facts to examine when looking at government and society in 
contemporary China. These facts cannot be accurately construed except with a lens of 
Chinese cultural understanding and an appreciation of Chinese history. 
First of all, the relationship between citizen and polity is very paradoxical. This 
may be attributed in part to the contradictions inherent in Chinese Communist orthodoxy, 
in part to the unique historical experience of the Chinese straddling socialism and 
capitalism, agrarian and technological economies, remote villages and tremendous 
megalopolises. Despite the paradoxes in Chinese politics, the CCP is not as unpopular as 
Western media often makes it out to be (sometimes through coercive methods such as 
when an American news reporter at Tiananmen encouraged a student whom he had just 
ate with to claim on television that he was on a hunger strike). For example, polls in 
China show that while most Chinese do not "trust" and are generally not "proud" of their 
government, they are nevertheless "in support" of it.16 
This is attributable to an aspect of Chinese culture that one researcher labels 
"Chinese instrumentalism:" a pragmatic view that bases the social contract on the 
expectation that government will promote growth, not uphold abstract ideologies. With 
some called the potential convert to inform them that they had stood the missionary up, and that that was a 
very rude thing to do. 
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this in mind, it is a mistake for Westerners to assume that the Chinese acceptance of 
authoritarian rule (however short term it may turn out to be) is purely the result of 
coercion, misinformation, and backwardness. In fact, most Chinese seem to recognize 
the desirability of securing better human rights practices. However, most will also cite 
the historically gradualist steps other nations, including the U.S., have taken to gain these 
heightened freedoms. For them, it would be absurd to fight for such things before they 
have secured more fundamental blessings which their past experience keeps them from 
taking for granted - political independence from foreign interference, economic stability, 
and freedom to eat three meals a day. 
COMMUNICATING DAMAGING BIASES 
There are several sources of bias and ineffectivity when it comes to protesting 
human rights practices in China - political rhetoric, intellectual literature, military action, 
and the press all make a unique contribution to what is, collectively, the effort to improve 
human rights in China. Each set of voices has its own dynamics. For example, political 
rhetoric by visiting presidents and congressional leaders debating such things as WTO-
admission usually lend the strongest, as well as the most audible voice, to 
counterproductivity. Intellectuals, on the other hand, have created an environment that 
stifles any thought which could lead to an improvement in our approach to human rights 
in China. I will examine expression of U.S. foreign policy through political rhetoric, 
intellectual literature, military action, and the press. 
Political rhetoric on human rights practices in China comes from American 
politicians in irregular waves. China is a gigantic nation that somehow only enters the 
16 Ming Wan, Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations, (Pennsylvania: 2000), pg. 32. 
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American political radar screen during times of conflict (Hainan Spy Plane Incident) or 
periods of intense integration (WTO). The most effective remarks for both accurate 
policy-making at home and conveying a positive message to the Chinese are those which 
are measured and respectful. For instance, during the congressional vote on the repeal of 
Most Favored Nation status, Present Clinton told a group of students of international 
affairs to keep in mind that China's "leaders are very intelligent people" who "know 
exactly what they're doing." He went on to suggest that economic change would give the 
Chinese increased "imperative" to reform politically. 17 
Comments such as these are much less offensive to both Chinese culture and 
reality than comments like the ones heard in congressional testimony before the House 
Ways and Means Committee two months later. The committee had convened prior to the 
final vote on MFN-status for China, ( even though the vote was symbolic since WTO 
admission had already been agreed upon with Chinese leaders). For instance, Charles 
Rangel (D. New York) wondered aloud how the U.S. could "so easily agree to engage 
with a billion communists in China." Sandy Levin (D. Michigan) went on to encourage 
congress to create an oversight committee to "place an ongoing and focused spotlight on 
China" which would ultimately be more concentrated than the yearly review then in place 
through MFN renewal. Later in the testimonial, Frank Wolf (Virginia) went on to 
compare China to Nazi Germany. 18 
These three statements are not only irresponsible policy suggestions (by virtue of 
their being counterfactual), but they damage our relations with the Chinese when 
conveyed to them via the press or intelligence gathering. Although most in China would 
17 Clinton's Words on China: Trade is a Smart Thing, The New York Times, March 8, 2000. 
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probably laugh off the suggestion that there are a billion communists (there are less than 
half a million) there, and that the disparate arrests of dissidents and activists there is 
comparable to the systematic genocide of Hitler's Germany, the suggestion made by 
Congressman Levin that the U.S. should create an oversight committee would definitely 
offend many Chinese students, workers, and peasants. Who gave the American 
government the right to monitor and judge another sovereign nation? Suggestions such as 
Congressman Levin's are as presumptuous as they are counterproductive. If anyone has 
the right to monitor human rights practices in Mainland China, it is the Chinese people 
themselves, independent groups around the world, or the United Nations. 
Intellectual debate is, surprisingly, one of the least diverse forums on the issue of 
culture and human rights in China. Since the collapse of communism thirteen years ago, 
Wes tern intellectual sentiment has streamlined into sets of untested presumptions that 
some have labeled the prevailing "Western liberal orthodoxy." 19 It is a set of assumptions 
that are extremely intolerant of anyone who suggests that Western liberalism is not a 
wholesale collection of better values than anything any other culture has, or may have, to 
offer. It fails to keep with a truly liberal tradition in that it is not pluralistic - rather, it 
presumes superiority in Western values and closes the door to any amount of parity 
between Western values and those of another culture. 
In a globalizing world where cultures new and ancient are thrust into 
interdependency, it is vital that American intellectuals take a view that is, at least, more 
tolerant (not necessarily pluralistic) towards other cultures. Doing so is not a cowardly 
confession that our own values are inferior, but a courageous assertion that our own 
18 Comments taken from Hearing before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives One 
Hundred Sixth Congress Second Sesssion, May 3, 2000. Printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office. 
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values are strong enough that a) they needn't be held up through coercion and force, and 
b) they will prove themselves superior in their own due time. 
Cultural intolerance is dangerous not only because it increases the likelihood of 
conflict between regions, but also because it creates an intellectual reactionism within the 
self-perceived superior culture. America may only conditionally and condescendingly 
extend respect to a nation like Singapore for its miraculous economic and social 
transformations because it scoffs at anecdotal stories of not being able to chew bubble 
gum in Singaporean streets. We, ever playing the role of rights-loving patriots, tend to 
dismiss economic ends gained at the price of civil liberties. This type of moral 
haughtiness obscures facts that would be of our benefit to appreciate - the Singaporean 
system works to improve many of the rights Americans currently do not enjoy. The most 
glaring example is Singapore's relatively non-existent rate of violent crime. Can 
Americans not at least respect another culture's independent decision to give up certain 
things for the comfort of being able to roam whatever neighborhood they like without 
fear of robbery, rape, or murder? We cannot say the American system - as much as we 
may cherish it - has done the same in even the neighborhoods that surround our nation's 
capitol. 
United States Military Action often inadvertently offends and alienates the U.S. 
from the very people it is trying to help. It does this through an unavoidable unevenness 
of action; nevertheless, better communication campaigns would alleviate the growing 
discontent that results from this. Even when U.S. aid was extended to those traditionally 
seen as being outside the Western cultural umbrella, Bosnian Muslims, many from the 
Muslim culture were quick to denounce American actions as maliciously delayed. No 
19 Can Asians Think, pg. 14. 
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military campaign is perfect; the dizzying demands of war and international diplomacy 
are irremediably uneven. People will undoubtedly find offense with whatever action the 
U.S. takes in keeping international peace. However, the U.S. could also go a long way to 
ameliorating the effects of other's misinformation of U.S. military efforts. For instance, 
while hostile Arabs were accusing the U.S. of colluding to let Muslims die in Bosnia, 
Americans in the Middle East could have been explaining their best efforts to protect 
both Muslims and Croats in Bosnia. Furthermore, one would imagine that there are many 
Muslims in Bosnia who are presently very grateful for the U.S./U.N. effort to end Serbian 
incursions and war crimes in their country. Could not they be called upon to testify to 
those of their Muslim brothers who are claiming that America seeks to destroy Islam at 
every tum? 
The Press is perhaps the guiltiest party in conveying biased information to the 
Western public on situations and attitudes in the other cultures. This is especially 
dangerous since, no matter the amount of interconnectivity between cultures, the press 
still stands for most Americans as the only tributary to the flow of information from other 
cultures into the American mind. It would be helpful if America would wake up to the 
monopoly of press coverage "our own" have on the world's information. After spending 
two years in Taiwan and several months in China, I have concluded that the Asia which 
the Western media had presented me with (a China full of technocrats and peasants all 
hankering for American freedoms and a Taiwan full of democrats uncritically accepting 
American influence) is extremely inaccurate. In China, between the microscopic poles of 
democracy advocates and hard-line communists, Anglophiles and Anglophobes, there are 
a tremendous amount of people who are simply not interested in the rights America wants 
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to impose upon it and who are quite confused by a nation whose primary national holiday 
celebrates independence from colonialization yet simultaneously meddle in other's 
morality. The Western press conspicuously ignores views such as this even though they 
seem to be held by the silent majority of Chinese people. 
All in all, these different voices come together to stifle an effort which has the 
best of intentions. The Western press and intellectual debate paints a very close-minded, 
illiberal picture of China. The media does this by giving an unrepresentative amount of 
coverage to those Chinese citizens whose sentiments align with Western values, but who 
in no way represent a major voice in China. Western intellectuals commit a similar error 
in arrogating a superiority of Western values that would best be left up to the due course 
of events, rather than coerced into actualization. Inaccurate and misapplied attention 
from media and scholarly sources in America gives rise to other sources of ineffectivity 
in the human rights effort. Political rhetoric and misinformation about military 
campaigns are but two of these. 
THE SOLUTION 
History is repeating itself. In the mid-Seventeenth Century westerners found 
themselves in a situation similar to the one the West as a whole now finds itself in - as 
interlopers in a Chinese affair which they would like to influence with their own moral 
standards. In the Seventeenth Century, these standards of morality descended from a 
system of Catholic theology which placed god at its head and people in his service; three 
hundred years later, the Western system of morality descends from a form of humanism 
that ultimately places man at its head, and whose unfolding has been the domain of 
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Hobbes, Locke, Jefferson, Madison and others. The epistemology may have changed 
from the religious to the secular, but let there be no doubt about what is at stake -
competing systems of morality; different perspectives of humanity's most fundamental-
and powerful - distinction, the distinction between right and wrong. Despite America's 
secular self-justifications, it has nonetheless not relinquished the role of missionary to a 
China that stands in need of help in "choosing the right path." 
It is imperative that America recognize the historical familiarity of what is 
occurring - that despite dramatic changes over the intervening centuries in dynamics and 
power structure between China and the West, there is a fundamental moral component 
that remains the same. It is imperative because failure in this sense has become 
routinized by Western powers. Furthermore, the West has continued to fail in their 
proselytizing effort (for good or bad) despite the formula for success being laid bare in 
virtually any Chinese history book. 
If America is going to succeed in its efforts to export its socio-political values 
alongside its economic products, it must digest the historical lessons of Matteo Ricci, 
Jesuit missionary and Chinese cultural aficionado. 
Ricci was the most positively effective western diplomat to ever work in China, 
where he lived for 30 years. He found favor in the eyes of the Chinese emperor - a 
remarkable feat for anyone, especially a foreigner - through two methods. First, he 
became very familiar with Chinese culture. He not only knew of its material abundance, 
but he appreciated its moral sophistication and strength. Furthermore, Ricci was not 
threatened by Confucian morality; his vision of Christianity-in-China included such 
Chinese cultural staples as ancestor worship and homage to Confucius. These Rites, he 
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reasoned, were civil rather than religious and did not threaten the sanctity of Christianity. 
Second, Ricci served the emperor in positions which were not contingent upon the 
emperor's (or anyone else's) conversion to Christianity. Ricci and other Jesuit 
missionaries served the emperor as astronomers, cartographers, and engineers. 
As it turned out, the efforts and character of Ricci and his understudies resulted in 
enough Chinese conversions to Christianity that the criteria of conversion became an 
issue of imperial edict for Emperor Kangxi in 1692. This time period represents the high-
water mark in Western-Chinese relations. With the possible exception of the Comintern 
agent Michael Borodin in the 1920s, Westerners have never enjoyed such influence and 
integration in Chinese polity. Unfortunately, this cooperative goodwill soon came to an 
end when the missionaries, intoxicated with the possibility of mass conversions, adopted 
measures that were not in keeping with Ricci' s appreciative treatment of Chinese culture. 
The fateful juncture that took Western relations away from the cultural deftness of 
Ricci down the path it presently finds itself in the aftermath of arose when Pope Clement 
XI decided, upon consulting with an emissary, that Ricci' s allowance of Confucian 
practices after conversion was sacrilegious. The Pope issued an edict of his own that 
threatened any convert who did not reject Confucianism with excommunication. While 
many missionaries continued in the spirit of cultural tolerance, many did not. The 
disagreement eventually wrecked a very promising exchange of religious and scientific 
teachings. As Jonathon Spence notes, 
This mutual hard line wrecked the power base of the missions in China 
and effectively prevented the spread of Western teaching and science. 
Had either side been more flexible, then later in the eighteenth century, 
when the Catholic church accepted the findings of Galileo and the 
missionaries started to introduce up-to-date Western astronomy to the 
Chinese, the new knowledge and techniques might have led to significant 
changes in Chinese attitudes about thought and nature. 20 
The lesson that Ricci' s brief window of success teaches us when viewed 
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alongside the ensuing years of mistrust and unequal relationships is that genuine success 
in cross-cultural interaction with the Chinese requires a healthy fusion of old and new. In 
Ricci's case, the new concepts of Catholicism were wed with the old concepts of 
Confucianism. 
As is evident with the pope in this instance, westerners tend to chafe at the 
prospect of a mutual blending of cultural standards. But in a "shrinking" world where 
previously indifferent cultures are increasingly dependent upon other cultures, is there 
any other peaceful option? Wholesale adaptations do not work by any society, at any 
level of culture or conscious - religious, governmental, or philosophical. Even the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution- an indigenous attempt at the wholesale adoption of new, 
psuedo-scientific principles - backfired, leaving decades of confusion and metaphysical 
wounds. 
Even many adaptations by foreigners of western culture which seem to be done 
with no regard for native culture rarely tum out that way; that is, when one peers deeper 
into the minds and behavior of a foreigner in western clothing, listening to western music, 
watching western movies, it becomes very obvious that the foreigner retains the more 
deeply engrained habits of his culture. If it were any other way, he would be adrift in an 
identity-less sea of metaphysical noise. 21 
20 Spence, Jonathon D., The Search for Modern China, (New York: W.W. Norton), 1999. 
21 I drew this conclusion after working with many youth in Taiwan. Many of the "adrift" youth I mention 
here were, I'm afraid, converts to my own religion who seemed to have no identity beyond the religious 
one handed to them by missionaries. 
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When championing the success of Taiwanese democracy, Americans often 
overlook the uniquely Taiwanese characteristics which their democracy possesses. The 
most obvious is that its actualization took forty years to bloom; that America's strategic 
ally, Jiang Kai Shek, was a brutal authoritarian leader who paid only lip service to 
democracy. It wasn't until the late 80s when the martial law that was declared in the 
early 50s was removed and civil right restored; it wasn't until the presidential election of 
Chen Shui Bian in recent years that experts were actually convinced Taiwanese 
democracy would support a change in party power. Mahbubani has suggested that if the 
U.S. had, with Taiwan and Korea, pursued the intolerant and condemning policies it 
pursues with modernizing nations today, both Taiwanese and Korean democracy never 
would have come about. Taiwan and Korea were, in the early stages of democracy and 
capitalism, guilty of human rights abuses on par with that of China; nevertheless, we feel 
it more appropriate to condemn China instead of, as we did with Taiwan and Korea, give 
near unconditional support in a belief that the abuses were anomalies in the larger scheme 
of things. 
The challenge of creative adaptation between cultures is already being 
successfully dealt with by the organizations at the forefront of global integration -
multinational corporations and businesses. Business leaders and management consultants 
have already taken the lead in suggesting new types of leadership to deal with the 
adaptive challenge of different cultures in the workplace. 
Recently, editors of the Harvard Business Review published their first ever "Best 
of' issue devoted to the its most significant articles on the art ofleadership. In an article 
titled "The Work of Leadership," Donald Laurie and Ronald Heifetz outline one of the 
central problem-producing aspects of the workplace: "conflicts across functions," or, 
conflicts that arise over seemingly technical issues, such as procedures, lines of 
communications, and schedules. The authors argue that the effective leader is the one 
who sees the depth of these conflicts, that they are "in fact proxies for underlying 
conflicts about values and norms.',22 
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In a world where competing values and norms come continually into conflict -as 
in diplomacy with the Chinese- the effective leader must adopt effective stratagems to 
tum conflict into the benefit of the company. There are two main stratagems suggested 
by Heifetz and Laurie. The first is a suggestion that executives "breakdown a 
longstanding behavior pattern ... providing leadership in the form of solutions.'' This 
attitude worked, they argue, only when adaptive challenges were at a minimum. In an 
environment where there was little dispute over fundamental values, the CEO could 
effectively provide solutions based upon his indisputable authority and higher 
competence. But the environment has since changed to a more varied global reality, 
where competing normative perceptions continually jostle across functional lines, within 
a company. The real solution to this new challenge, they argue, is to rely more upon the 
"collective intelligence of employees at all levels," rather than to simply making 
unilateral decisions for them. 
In foreign policy behavior, America is no stranger to unilateral solution 
implementation. This fact was perhaps best summed up by Vojislav Kostunica, a U.S. 
ally. Within a week of winning Serbia's presidential election, Mr. Kostunica made two 
telling statements about U.S. foreign policy. First, he stated that "the United States has 
22 Ronald Heifetz and Donald Laurie, Harvard Business Review, "The Work of Leadership, December 
2001. 
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done too much meddling in our internal affairs. "23 Later, Mr. Kostunica went on to 
complain that the Americans were wrong in applying the view that there was a solution to 
every problem to Kosovo; Kosovo, he argued, was like Jerusalem, a problem without a 
clear solution that needed cooperation and creativity at all levels involved. 24 
Leaders of the twenty-first century, Laurie and Heifetz argue, are more apt to ask 
tough questions instead of attempting to provide all the right answers; they are less 
willing to protect people, letting them "feel the pinch" of reality themselves; instead of 
stopping conflicts, they tease the underlying issues out for all parties to solve. This 
approach is both more effective and more difficult to do, more effective because it 
requires all parties involved to shoulder the responsibilities of conflict management; more 
difficult because it requires letting go of the illusion that the paternal CEO is in control. 
The second principle advocated by Laurie and Heifetz is one of enlightened 
diversity. "Different people," the argue, "within the same organization bring different 
experiences, assumptions, values, beliefs, and habits to their work." These differences 
are, in fact, strengths to be channeled, not weaknesses to be glossed over. Diversity, they 
argue, is a prerequisite for "innovation and learning." 
A healthy pluralism, such as the one advocated by Heifetz and Laurie, would 
benefit the United States in the international arena. In dealing with the Chinese, at least, 
relationships can only be harmonized if differences are appreciated ( or ignored) and 
similarities maximized. The international organizations that the U.S. finds itself the 
leading member in -WTO, the UN, and G7- also benefit from differing national values, 
beliefs, assumptions, and experiences. It serves no one's best interest when an 
23 Yugoslav Chief Upset at Some of His Allies, The New York Times, by Steven Erlanger, October 12, 
2000. 
embarrassing situation such as human rights is brought up as a point of protest or 
humiliation. 
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Instead, these differences should be approached in an open framework, but not 
one where leaders simply trade accusations and insults about the worst possible 
conditions in each nation. This approach serves no one, least of all those political 
prisoners or enemies of the Chinese state who are tortured and beaten. This open 
framework is only possible if American policymakers shelve any illusions they may have 
of homogenizing the world into their own image overnight. The developing nations of 
the world have every reason to take a gradual course in the emancipation of civil liberties 
as America itself took. If American-style democracy is to triumph, it will only do so 
because it presents itself as the most desirable, most humanitarian form of government. 
When Americans themselves seek to artificially augment this by interfering in the 
internal affairs of sovereign nations and adopting carrot-stick measures of political and 
economic reform, natives of other foreign nations gain a distorted view of American 
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